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Introduction
1 The  sustainable  management  of  the  different  kinds  of  resources  (natural,  cultural,
infrastructural) of a territory constitutes a condition sine qua non for the sustainability of
its social-economic development (Nahrath, Gerber 2014). This issue is especially critical in
the case of fragile and/or marginalized territories such is the case in many mountainous
areas.  Mountain massifs  in general,  and the Alps in particular,  indeed are territories
characterized by resource systems which are both fragile, in terms of ecosystems, and
subject  to  intensive,  even  blatantly  destructive  uses  from  activity  sectors  such  as
hydropower, transportation, tourism, agriculture, as well as industry and housing (Barros
et al. 2015, Fort 2015). These pressures on Alpine resources are even more evident in the
case  of  touristic  spaces,  which  are  subjected  to  impacts  that  are  both  intense  and
temporally variable, given the high seasonality of tourism (Briassoulis & van der Straaten
2000; Briassoulis 2002)1.
2 The comprehension of the concrete use-modalities of Alpine territorial resources, as well
as the identification of the institutional conditions for their sustainable management,
constitutes  both  a  scientific  and  practical  objective,  all  the more  relevant  from the
perspective of a sustainable territorial development for the Alpine regions. This article
aims to contribute to an understanding of these phenomena, and toward this end we
suggest applying the institutional resource regimes (IRR) analytical framework (Knoepfel
Coordination Between Institutional Resource Regimes as a Condition for Sustai...
Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine, 104-3 | 2016
1
et al. 2007 ; Varone et al. 2008 ; Gerber et al. 2009) to a specific Alpine touristic area: the
tourism resort  of  Crans-Montana in the Swiss  canton of  Valais.  The goal  of  such an
approach is to show the effects of institutional rules (public policies and property rights)
—and their reappropriation by actors—on the (non)sustainability of the management of
different Alpine resource systems.
3 We defend here five theses, which we will discuss by way of the example of touristic
regions, here specifically Crans-Montana:
1. The concentration of many uses of alpine resources within touristic spaces has provoked
strong competition between uses which has often led to the establishment of multiple state
regulations coming equally from public law (public policies, constitutional law), private law
(civil codes, codes of responsibility), or court jurisprudence. It is in the framework of what
we propose calling institutional resource regimes (IRR) that actors—both public (communes,
cantons) and private (hydroelectricity, tourism, real estate) or communitarian (irrigation or
pasture consortages)—who exploit and manage these resources have developed strategies
around the implementation of  these formal  rules.  These strategies  for  activating or  not
activating these rules, or even circumventing or deflecting the formal rules of IRR, have
been conceptualized in terms of localized regulatory arrangements (LRA) (Bréthaut 2013a,
Bréthaut 2013b; Schweizer 2015)2.
2. The analytical  framework of  institutional  resource regimes (IRR)  constitutes  a  pertinent
theoretical and conceptual approach, both analytically as normatively, in that it  permits
analyzing and evaluating the coherence and performance (in terms of the management of
Alpine resources) of existing regimes, as well as the regulatory arrangements established by
public  authorities  and  stakeholders  regarding  these  resources.  In  fact,  one  of  the  main
contributions of this analytical framework is in the analysis of the causal relations between
institutional  rules,  strategies  of  actors  during  their  implementation,  and  resource
management sustainability.
3. The case of Crans-Montana is an excellent illustration of the causal links between tourism
development, the creation of tourist resources (or of touristic uses of existing resources),
the emergence of competition over resources and of resource scarcity, and finally, threats to
their sustainable management. It equally allows showing how the risks of scarcity and the
threats to the availability of touristic resources lead in certain cases to the emergence of
innovative  practices  and arrangements,  on the part  of  local  actors,  for  regulating these
competing uses, and this in the interstices of existing IRR.
4. The  sustainable  development  of  touristic  Alpine  spaces  implies  the  development  of
coordinated management strategies for the whole of territorial resources (i.e., a “resource
geopolitics of touristic regions”3) at the scale of the touristic “functional space” (Nahrath et
al. 2009 ; Varone et al. 2013).
5. In all, this approach by way of IRR permits grasping the fundamentally political dimension of
the processes creating and managing Alpine resources. In particular, it allows taking into
account relations and strategies of power resulting from the redistributive stakes of such
management,  which most  often consists  of  a  limitation or reallocation of  use  rights—in
other words, of the right to draw on the flow of economic benefits deriving from such uses
(Bromley 1992)—in or among different groups of users of these resources.
4 In  the  remainder  of  this  article  we  will  first  describe  the  IRR  analytical  framework
starting from activities (touristic). Second, we will describe the touristic area of Crans-
Montana, focusing on the principal issues for touristic resource management (notably
water, land, and real estate). Third, we will revisit the case in light of the five theses
presented above,  and we will  discuss their relevance.  Finally,  we will  draw the main
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lessons of this discussion and list a several principles and practical recommendations for
a more sustainable management of Alpine resources.
 
The “institutional resource regime” (IRR) analytical
framework
5 The IRR framework is based on a concept of resource derived from a mixture of economic
(institutional  and  territorial  economy)  and  ecological approaches  (taking  into
consideration  ecosystem  services)  to  sustainability,  inscribed  in  a  relational  and
constructivist perspective (Knoepfel et al. 2001 ; Nahrath, Gerber 2014). Inspired especially
by the work of L. Kébir (2004, 2010), we define a resource (here Alpine or touristic) as a
process  of  relating  an  “object”  and  an  economic,  cultural  or  ecological  “system  of
production” which produces goods and (eco)services allowing the satisfaction of more or
less vital needs of human beings or other living beings.
6 The Alpine territories in this way encompass numerous “objects”—both material (terrain,
water-courses,  glaciers,  forests,  infrastructure etc.)  and immaterial (social  and cultural
practices, know-how, etc.)—which are transformed into resources by diverse systems of
production (agriculture,  tourism,  hydroelectricity,  etc.)  producing  both  material goods
(agricultural  products,  ski  slopes,  electricity,  etc.)  and  immaterial  services (recreation,
well-being,  sociability,  esthetic  pleasure,  etc.),  allowing  the  development  and
reproduction of certain human activities (lodging, movement, work, leisure, etc.) over a
more or less long term.
7 The great majority of these uses of Alpine resources as goods and services (G+S) involve
the removal or use of resource units (square feet of soil; cubic meters of water, wood or
air; polluting emissions; noise; alterations to the landscape; destruction of flora or fauna,
etc.) leading to competition between different user groups (local or external to the area). 
8 This competition can be of three orders, and these may appear in combination:
1. Homogenous single-resource competition: concerns competition between users of one and the
same good or service provided by a single resource, such as irrigation, the market for land
and housing, timber extraction, hunting, potable water, etc.
2. Heterogeneous single-resource competition: concerns competition between different user groups
pursuing  different  and  rival  uses  of  the  same  resource,  such  as  drinking  water  versus
artificial snow-making, the transfers of parcels of land between zones for building versus for
agriculture, etc. 
3. Multi-resource  competition  (heterogeneous):  concerns  competition  between  different  user
groups where the uses of a good or service from a resource has negative effects on one or
several other goods or services furnished by other resources (cf. figure 3, below), such as
construction of housing projects, implying a need for drinking water, versus irrigation versus
artificial snow-making versus protection of the landscape and biodiversity, etc.
9 As  has  been  well  described  in  the  literature  on  the  management  of  common-pool
resources (Ostrom 1990, 1992), particularly in the thesis of the tragedy of the commons
(Hardin 1968), the existence of competition between groups of users removing units of an
extractable4 resource brings a significant risk of overexploitation, the different groups of
users developing more and more aggressive strategies for capture and removal of the
resource, in accord with its perceived scarcity.
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10 One can in this way distinguish three broad categories of rules, which historically have
been developed for regulating such resource systems: 
• bodies of rules developed, beginning in the Middle Ages, within the frame of self-organized
common-pool  resource institutions (Ostrom 1990),  such as,  in the Alpine regions, consortages
(associations  of  co-owners  or  users),  bourgeoisies (in  Switzerland,  holders  of  rights  of
communal citizenship), guilds and brotherhoods, often of quite long standing, predating the
establishment of modern states, their policies and their civil codes (common property law);
• the  formalization  of  property  rights  in  the  framework  of  the  civil  code  and  court
jurisprudence, with the creation of nation states (18th -19th centuries) (private law);
• the limitation of use rights of entitled parties and of land owners, as well as the obligations
to protect (natural) resources, by way of the progressive establishment, from the end of the
19th century, of public policies for exploitation and then for protection of these resources (public
law). 
11 From the 19th century, as modern states were institutionalized and regimes of public and
private law gained sway, common property regimes were integrated, and often dissolved
(Aubin and Nahrath 2015). The result is that, today, the attribution and regulation of most
use rights derive from either (1) the holding of formal property (in the form of a title), or
(2) measures contained in public policies, or, most frequently, (3) a combination of the two,
public policies limiting the scope of proprietary use rights. 
12 It is precisely of this double foundation of use rights, resulting from the combination of
provisions from private and public law, that the analytical framework of institutional
resource regimes seeks to give account (cf. figure 1).
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Figure 1: the analytical framework of institutional resource regimes (IRR)
Source : Gerber et al. 2009.
This analytical framework allows showing supposed causal relations between (1) the constituent
rules of IRR (upper box), the use behaviors of actors (owners and users) (central box), and the nature
of uses and removals, as well as the state of the resource (lower box).
13 More precisely, the IRR analytical framework allows piecing together the ensemble of
regulations  within  public  law  (public  policies)  and  private  law  (civil  code,  code  of
obligations,  contracts,  concessions,  surface  rights,  easements,  etc.)  having  a  role  in
defining the use rights and dispositions5 of  owners and users of the resource.  It  also
allows evaluating the coherence6 of the regime, as well as its extent 7 and capacity to
regulate different uses and competition between uses.
14 The  IRR  framework  also  allows  distinguishing  four  distinct  regulatory  modes  for  a
resource (arrows (1),  (2),  (3),  (4) in figure 1) :  (1) regulation by way of public policies
without effects on the content of property rights; (2) regulation by way of public policies
with a substantial impact on the value and content of property rights; (3) regulation by
redefining the institution of property rights (principally through a modification of the
civil  code);  (4)  the redefinition of the distributional structure of property rights (e.g.
nationalization or privatization). 
15 The IRR analytical framework is based on the following two fundamental hypotheses:
16 1. To the extent that the sustainable management of a resource implies, in most cases, a
more or less restrictive limitation on its use, one of its immediate consequences is an
increased scarcity of available resource units, and therefore a risk of growing competition
between different categories of users. As such, a sustainable management of resources
implies important stakes in the redistribution of use rights between rival users.
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17 2. The redistributive capacity of a regime, and thus its ability to regulate, reconcile and
reduce competition between uses and rival groups of users, depends essentially on its
degree of coherence and its extent. In this way, the more coherent and extensive a regime
is, the more it will have important redistributive powers, and the greater chance that it
will allow sustainable management of the resource. 
18 In the same way, the sustainability of an activity mobilizing several resources will depend not
only on the coherence and extent of different resource regimes, but also on these regimes
being made coherent and consistent with relation to each other (cf. figure 3, below).
19 And if one widens the scale of analysis further, the sustainability of a territorial system will
depend on making the different resource regimes applied to the ensemble of activities
present within a functional territory coherent (following the sense of Nahrath et al. 2009
and Varone et al. 2013). A given strategy for bringing several resource regimes for a single
territory  into  a  coherent  ensemble  reflects  what  we  suggest  calling  a  “resource
geopolitics.” 
 
Crans-Montana: a laboratory for analyzing the
management of Alpine resources8
20 Crans-Montana  presents  an  interesting  laboratory  for  analyzing  modes  of  resource
management within a mountainous touristic area. Many studies have approached this
case, concentrating on hydrologic questions (Finger et al. 2013), the operative ways of
managing  water  resources  (Bonriposi  2013,  Clivaz  &  Reynard  2008,  Reynard  2000),
questions of resort governance of the resort (Clivaz 2006) and water networks (Bréthaut
2013a,  Bréthaut  2013b),  and  social-political  questions  (Schneider  2015,  Schneider  et
Homewood 2013). The case offers interesting features for analyzing homogeneous and
heterogeneous competition for Alpine resources, particularly water resources, within the
touristic area.
21 The first distinctive feature refers back to the geographic setting of the resort, which is
located in central Valais, a particularly dry area. Although at the heart of the Alps, the
area is  marked by significant periods of  drought,  which led to the building of  many
irrigation canals to move water from source regions to areas under cultivation (Nahrath
et al. 2011). Second, the resort is characterized by significant institutional fragmentation,
since it was developed over the land of six communes9 (fig. 2). As such, the management
of  urban  water  depends  on  six  water  services  and  six  communal  owners  of  their
corresponding  surface  water10.  Third,  Crans-Montana  has one  of  the  largest  visitor
capacities of the country (44,000 tourist beds) and thus experiences large fluctuations in
its resident population (6,000 permanent residents versus 40,000 inhabitants during peak
visitation. The final feature is the highly unequal division of touristic resources within
the zone. The communes least endowed with water have the greatest lodging capacities,
and the communes most endowed with water have the least tourism infrastructure
(Bréthaut 2013a). As a result, there are many transfers of water between the communes,
often  based  on  informal  agreements,  marking  a  division  of  labor:  while  peripheral
communes  (Icogne  and  Mollens)  contribute  to  the  provision  of  water  (water  and
biodiversity  resources),  other  communes  (Lens  and  Randogne)  have  built  significant
infrastructure for transferring water,  while lodging for tourists  (land and real  estate
resources) depends mainly on three communes: Chermignon, Montana, and Randogne.
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22 The combination of these different elements leads us to observe that what can be called a
“resource geopolitics”, where actors negotiate in order to guarantee the supply of goods
and  services  necessary  for  their  activities.  These  negotiations  are  in  large  measure
characterized by informal arrangements (Bréthaut 2013b), often established in a bilateral
fashion between communes, allowing the construction of a custom-made system, suiting
the particularities of the functional space of the resort (Varone et al. 2013).
 
Aminona: the effects of a new politics of tourism
development
23 Among the six communes of Crans-Montana, Mollens, situated at the eastern extreme of
the  resort,  is  an  excellent  illustration of  the  regulatory  stakes  in  a  configuration of
competition for goods and services coming from different resources.
24 The Tièche river flows over this  territory,  and the ownership of  its  water is  divided
among  different  water  rights.  These  rights  pertain  to  communes  within  the  resort
(Mollens, Randogne) but also to some communes downstream from the area (fig 2). In this
context, the commune of Randogne built a conduit in the 1920s crossing the territory of
Mollens. This infrastructure allows the commune of Randogne to carry its water rights to
its territory, but also allows the commune of Mollens to transfer, if necessary, the water it
is  entitled  to  to  the  other  communes,  this  free  of  charge  within  the  framework  of
informal agreements seeking a well-functioning shared touristic system. 
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Figure 2: the functional area of the Crans-Montana resort
Source : Nahrath, Bréthaut.
The Tièche, owing to the conduit, is the second principal source of water for Randogne, a
highly touristic commune. The river thus plays a significant role during peaks in
consumption and this for the entire Crans-Montana resort. Furthermore, based on
informal agreements, Randogne benefits from water surpluses not being developed by
Mollens for its own supply.
25 Beyond its importance to the water supply for the resort, Mollens is also in a significant
position for the future development of Crans-Montana. The commune holds the greatest
reserve  of  construction  zones  within  the  area. As  present,  just  a  small  part  of  the
commune’s territory has been dedicated to touristic activity, as the Aminona resort, built
ex nihilo during the 1970s and comprising three lodging towers, the only survivors from
an original project which envisioned 21 buildings. 
26 Until  now,  the  local  geopolitical  equilibrium  has  been  maintained  thanks  to
intercommunal cooperation,  the strength of which has depended in large part on its
flexibility as well as informality. Mollens’ strategy however is oriented toward increased
tourism development  within  its  territory.  This  development  will  in  the  end  require
increasing the water supply of the commune through the development of new sources.
But it also brings into question the exchanges and sales of water carried out from its
territory, based in part on informal arrangements. Since 2008, the commune has been the
theater of several large-scale tourism projects destined to further develop the building
zone of Aminona. These initiatives have witnessed the bankruptcy of certain promoters,
and the filing of an appeal by three environmental groups. The latter have argued that
the area includes dry meadows forming part of the Federal Inventory of Landscapes and
Natural  Monuments of  National  Importance,  that  the building permit  application file 
linked  to  the  project  had  been  split  into  several  separate  procedures,  and  that  the
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projected construction zone did not conform to the Federal Law on Spatial Planning —for
being  clearly  too  large  and  poorly  situated.  Despite  these  appeals,  decisions  by  the
Federal Court in 2012 and 2014 have opened the way for beginning construction, and in
2013 the Aminona Luxury Resort and Village project found new financing. As of now, the
project comprises an area of 70,000 m2, including the construction of 15 hotel buildings
(building permits  issued),  40 individual  chalets  (building permits now granted for 27
chalets), five new towers of from 10 to 13 stories, and a public space (authorization in
process). It will bring substantially increased pressure on various resources, but water
resources especially, within the touristic space.
 
The sustainable management of tourism resources in
Crans-Montana: return to the five theses
27 The case of the Crans-Montana resort, as well as the more specific case of the tourism
project  being  led  in  Mollens,  supports  in  our  view the  five  theses  presented  in  the
introduction of this article:
28 First,  the  case  of  Mollens  demonstrates  well  the  relations  of  interdependence  and
competition for  uses  of  soil,  water,  biodiversity  and scenic  resources  (heterogeneous
multi-resource competition, cf. figure 3, below)11. The development of the properties in
the construction zone as part of a tourism project depends on the availability of water in
the commune of Mollens, a resource which for now is delivered in part for free to the
other communes of the resort—following informal arrangements. The completion of the
project risks reducing the flow of the Tièche that would be available for nurturing the dry
prairies  figuring  in  the  Federal  Inventory  of  Landscapes  and  Natural  Monuments  of
National Importance.
29 In so doing, it also points to the central role of the management of these resources, which
engages as much formal institutional rules of public law (territorial development polices,
water policies, policies regarding conservation of nature and the landscape) as private law
(land ownership rights, water rights, the absence of property rights over biodiversity and
the landscape), and the courts (the 2012 and 2014 decisions of the Federal Court regarding
the approval of construction permits for the tourism project).
30 The approach in terms of IRR allows,  secondly,  identifying the problematic effects for
territorial resource management of a lack of coordination, or even incoherence, between
regimes  regulating  different  resources,  or  between  formal  regimes  and  informal
arrangements (cf. figure 3 below). In this way the development of the touristic project of
the Aminona Luxury Resort—which is itself largely the result of the incoherence in the
management regime for the resource land (excessive size of the construction zone)—
greatly risks destabilizing the relatively fragile equilibrium established in the context of
informal arrangements concerning the sharing of water. In fact,  with the granting of
building permits being conditioned on a guarantee of a water supply for the tourism
complex, the commune of Mollens will be forced, eventually, to direct toward the later a
substantial part of the water now being transferred to the other communes of the resort
within the framework of these arrangements.
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Figure 3: Uses and use competition for territorial resources within a touristic area (from the
example of the Crans-Montana resort)
Source: Nahrath, Bréthaut
Analysis of the stakes in territorial resource management, starting with activities
(touristic and non-touristic), allows listing and quantifying in the field different types
of resource competition: homogeneous (1), heterogeneous (2), and inter-resource (3 and
4). Analysis through IRR then allows both evaluating the extent and coherence of
resource regimes in isolation as well as the degree of (non)coordination between the
different regimes. These parallel assessments allow the identification of: the principal
institutional factors responsible for the (non)sustainable management of the
resources; regulatory gaps (informal arrangements (LRA) likely having a prominent
role); and finally, needs for greater coordination between rival uses of resources, within
an optic of the integral management of the whole of territorial resources within the
functional touristic space (a “resource geopolitics”). 
31 Third, the case of Crans-Montana shows the significance of informal arrangements put in
place and developed in the shadow of the formal regulations of institutional resource
regimes. In this way, for example, gaps in the water regime, combined with the regime
for  communal  (at  times  communitarian)  ownership  of  water  resources,  explain  the
importance of such informal arrangements between actors which allow for rapid action,
helping maintain equilibria in a tourism space where consumption is dynamic and highly
variable across time. Informal arrangements thus construct a kind of custom regulation
complementing existing, formal resource regimes. In so doing, the system demonstrates a
flexibility and a significant capacity to adapt which constitutes the principal mark of its
efficacy. However, as the Mollens case shows, these arrangements can be strained by
strategies to intensify tourism development, when these change the equilibria between
the actors having originally elaborated those arrangements.
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Table 1: the repertoire of the whole of informal arrangements for water sharing between the water
networks of the communes of the Crans-Montana resort
Source : Bréthaut 2013a: 189.
The arrows indicate the direction in which informal water exchanges flow. As such, the table also
reveals the strong tendency of this geopolitics of water within the functional tourist space, in that the
central (touristic) communes are heavy consumers and are dependent on the peripheral (less
touristic) communes for their water supply. The development and subsequent resource demands of
the Aminona Luxury Resort, however, will likely force modifications to these informal arrangements.  
32 Fourth, from the perspective of the sustainable development of touristic areas in the Alps,
the case of the tourist complex project points to, at the very least implicitly, the need for
a “regional” strategy of resource management grounded in an explicit coordination of the
different institutional regimes for strategic resources (fig. 3) as well as of the informal
arrangements  which  accompany  their  implementation,  and  this  at  the  scale  of  the
functional  space  of  the  resort.  The  implementation  of  such  a  strategy  of  “resource
geopolitics”  depends  on  two  principal  conditions.  On  the  one  hand,  it  concerns
apprehending  and  monitoring  the  ensemble  of  different  removals  of  the  distinct
resources and, on the other hand, coordinating—that is to say also redistributing—the use
rights, not only between groups of users of the same resource (competition of the types 1
and 2 in figure 3), but also between groups of users having competing uses of different
resources (competition of the types 3 and 4 in figure 3).
33 Fifth,  the  case  of  Crans-Montana  allows  measuring  the  redistributive—and  therefore
political—character of the stakes in sustainable management of resources in a touristic
space.  One  finds  confirmation  of  this  in  the  various  conflicts  accompanying  the
development  of  the  tourist  complex,  with  environmental-protection  organizations
attacking the project for reasons of the landscape, using legal arguments taken from the
new federal ordinance limiting second homes (scenic resources), the federal ordinance
protecting air  quality (air  resources),  or the controls regarding the minimal flows of
watercourses and the protection of dry meadows (water resources and biodiversity). This
generation  of  conflict,  and  judicialization  of  the  management  of  Alpine  touristic
resources (the granting of construction permits for the Aminona Luxury Resort arose from
a Federal Court decisions), shows the acute need for an anticipatory strategy of “resource
geopolitics” at the scale of the functional touristic space.
 
Conclusion
34 This article has allowed illustrating, from a specific empirical case, the relevance and
validity of five arguments regarding what is at stake in the sustainable management of
Alpine touristic resources.
35 More specifically,  it  allowed showing that  the development of  touristic  activities  has
impacts on diverse resources (soil, water, scenery, biodiversity, air, etc.), and that these
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activities often enter into conflict with certain other uses (including non-touristic) of
these same resources. Such conflicts are likely to hinder sustainable management. For
this reason, the long-term maintenance of such tourist uses strongly depends on standing
regulations  (formal  and  informal)  for  the  different  resources  affected  by  touristic
activities.
36 Understanding the stakes tied to the management of resources in an Alpine touristic area
implies:  (1) a systematic analysis of the uses and rivalries over use that arise around
strategic resources (i.e. both the most essential and the most threatened), (2) an analysis
of  the  degree  of  coherence  (or  incoherence)  of  the  different  regimes  (formal)  and
arrangements  (informal)  regulating  these  different  resources  (figure  1),  and  (3)  an
analysis of  the level  of  coordination between these different resource regimes in the
(touristic) functional space (figure 3). 
37 In this  regard,  the development of  a  true strategy of  regional  “resource geopolitics”
probably  implies  the  establishment  of  (new)  more  or  less formalized  institutional
structures,  such  as:  intercommunal  associations,  fully  institutionalised  (touristic)
agglomerations; common-pool  resource  institutions,  informal  inter-resource
arrangements, or even the merging of communes. These new structures in charge of this
resource  geopolitics,  however,  will  have  to  vigilant  if  they  intend  to  establish  their
legitimacy over the long term, to avoid the trap, frequent in sustainability strategies, of
the  “club  effect”,  consisting  of  the  constitution  of  regimes  for  which  (internal)
sustainability is achieved to the detriment of the sustainability of the surrounding spaces
(external) (Nahrath et al. 2012).
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NOTES
1. This even while the good condition of these resources, assuring scenic quality, is a necessary
condition for these same tourist activities.
2. The ensemble of these notions and concepts are presented in greater detail in the following
section.
3. This notion of “resource geopolitics”, applied at a regional level, does not to our knowledge
refer  to  a  clearly  identifiable  body  of  scientific  literature.  Here  we  invoke  the  term  in  an
essentially intuitive and suggestive way, relying however on the related concept of “functional
space”, elaborated more explicitly. 
4. By extractability,  we mean a form of  removal  of  a  good or service by a user implying the
impossibility of other users to simultaneously use the same good or service.
5. By disposal rights, we mean the ensemble of rules defining the ability of owners to transfer
(give, sell, etc.) or engage (rent, pawn, mortgage) their formal property titles.
6. The analytical framework distinguishes three types of coherence: (a) the coherence of public
policies (especially between policies of exploitation and policies of protection), (b) the coherence
of  the system of  property rights  (a  clear  definition of  property  rights,  corresponding to  the
reality of the available resource units and (c)  the coherence between public policies and the
system of property rights (target groups of public policies are effectively holders of use rights
and the capacity of public policies to effectively regulate (in particular, to limit or redistribute)
rival/concurrent use rights over one or several goods and services in full drawn from of one or
several resources).
7. By extent of the regime, we mean the number of goods and services taken from the resource
which are effectively regulated, be it by public policies, property rights, or a combination of the
two.
8. For a more complete description of this case study, see Bréthaut & Nahrath 2011; Bréthaut
2013a, Bréthaut 2013b.
9. These were the communes of Icogne, Lens, Chermignon, Montana, Randogne, and Mollens,
which however will merge on January 1, 2017. 
10. In the canton of Valais, unlike most other Swiss cantons, the communes are considered the
owners of surface water. 
11. For a more in-depth description of these rivalries, see Bréthaut 2013a.
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ABSTRACTS
This article, drawing on the analytical approach of institutional resource regimes (IRR), offers an
original analysis of the challenges of resource management in an Alpine touristic space (Crans-
Montana  in  Switzerland).  Particularly,  it  shows  how  an  approach  in  terms  of  IRR  allows
identifying the institutional and political conditions for sustainable management, not only for
touristic activities as such, but also for a territorial system of resources as a whole. Based on this
analysis, the article advocates the development of a “resource geopolitics” strategy capable of
coordinating the different resource regimes at the scale of the functional space of the tourist
resort.
INDEX
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